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NOTE
NOTE
THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE AS RELATED
TO THE DIVERSITY CLAUSE IN STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS CASES
If a personal cause of action accrues in one state and is sued upon
in another, the problem of which state's statute of limitations shall
be applied is presented if suit would be barred under the statute of
one of the two states but not under the statute of the other. If the
suit is brought in the state courts, rather than the federal court, of the
forum, the solution of this problem will depend upon the forum
state's applicable conflict of laws rule and whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution is contravened by such ap-
plication. On the other hand, if suit is brought in a federal court sitting
in the forum state, additional considerations may require a different
result.'
I. Suit in the State Courts of the Forum
The Federal Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts ... of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts... shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
' 2
Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress held
2If suit is brought in a federal court because of diversity, it is still important
to determine whether the forum state courts could apply a forum statute of limi-
tations to an out-of-state-created cause of action without violating the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. If the state courts could not constitutionally apply such a
statute of limitations then it is clear that the federal courts may not do so. First
National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396, 72 S. Ct. 421, 96 L. ed.
441 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609, 71 S. C. 980, 95 L. ed. 1212 (1951).
However, if it is determined that the forum state courts could constitutionally apply
a forum statute of limitations, then a more difficult problem arises as to whether the
federal courts sitting within the forum state must likewise apply the forum statute
of limitatitons.
The first part of this Note is devoted to the first problem: Under what cir-
cumstances may a state court apply a forum statute of limitations to an out-of-state-
created cause of action without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution?
The second part of this Note will be published in the following issue of the
Washington and Lee Law Review and will be concerned with the problem: Is a
federal court required to close its doors to suit just because a forum limitation
period, constitutionally applicable in the forum state courts, has expired and the
state courts' doors are closed?
2U. S. Const., Art. IV, § i [italics supplied].
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its first session and passed the Judiciary Act of 1790, which provided
for the authentication of the statutes of the several states but which
said nothing regarding their "extra-territorial" operation.3 This
silence, however, has "been repealed, in part, by judicial decision." 4
The Supreme Court has held that acts of the state legislatures are cov-
ered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.5
Constitutional law writers seem to agree that this provision of the
Constitution came into being because "The framers of the Constitu-
tion felt ... that the rules of private international law [conflict of laws]
should not be left as among the States altogether on a basis of comity,
and hence subject always to the overruling local policy of the lex fori,
but ought to be in some measure at least placed on the higher plane of
constitutional obligation."
6
But as the Supreme Court of the United States has observed in
'See Annotated Constitution of the United States of America (1952) 652.
"Of course the provision that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each State
to the public acts ... of every other State' [sic] does not give extra territorial effect
to state legislation. It simply requires that, when rights or obligations have in one
State been fixed by the statutes of that State, the force of such statutes in fixing
such rights or obligations shall be recognized in controversies arising in any other
State." Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution (1922) 475- See Cooper v.
Newell, 173 U. S. 555, 19 S. Ct. 506, 43 L. ed. 8o8 (x899).
'Annotated Constitution of the United States of America (1952) 652.
'Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 154, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. ed.
1o26, 82 A. L. R. 696 (1932). But it is argued that by "public acts" of a state it was
meant those acts of its legislature, which had a general or "public" application as
distinct from those appertaining to the rights of some particular designated per-
son, or persons, only, which were known, by way of contradistinction, as "private
acts." And the history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in being shaped in the
constitutional convention would indicate this. See i Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States (1953) 542-43-
6Annotated Constitutiton of the United States of America (1952) 652. See
also Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today (0oth ed. 1948) 135, citing
Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law (3rd ed. 1898) 196-2o6. See i Crosskey,
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (1953) 55o where
it is said that "the 'command' which 'shall' [in the Full Faith and Credit Clause]
expresses, should comprehend the whole body of rules and principles to which the
clause relates. Nor can there be any doubt that this extraordinary step, of making
this whole department of the 'law of nations' a branch of constitutional law,
as between our states, was deliberately taken. For the records of the Convention
show that ihere was difference of opinion within that body as just what, in this
particular, had best be done; and although the Committee of Details had recom-
mended the step that finally was taken, various other proposals were made before
the substance of the committee's proposal, coupled, however, with a permission to
Congress to legislate in the field, which the committee had not included, was at last
adopted." In support of the position that conflict of laws were deemed to be part of
the common law at the time of the convention, see James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 1 L.
ed. 93 (U. S. 1786); Miller v. Hall, i Dali. 229, 1 L. ed. 113 (U. S. 1788).
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Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc..7 the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is not an inexorable and unqualified command. "It leases some
scope for state control within its borders of affairs which are peculiarly
its own. This Court has often recognized that, consistent with the appro-
priate application of the full faith and credit clause, there are limits
to the extent to which the laws and policy of one state may be subor-
dinated to those of another."8 It was, the Court said in the Pink case,
"the purpose of that provision [the Full Faith and Credit Clause]
to preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and ju-
dicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their
validity in others. But the very nature of the federal union of states, to
each of which is reserved the sovereign right to make its own laws,
precludes resort to the Constitution as the means for compelling one
state wholly to subordinate its own laws and policy concerning its
peculiarly domestic affairs to the laws and policy of others. When such
conflict of interest arises, it is for this Court to resolve it by determin-
ing how far the full faith and credit clause demands the qualification
or denial of rights asserted under the laws of one state, that of the
forum, by the public acts and judicial proceedings of another."9 Thus,
the Supreme Court has taken the view that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not compel a state to adopt any particular set of rules of
conflict of laws but merely sets certain minimum requirements which
each state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state.10
"The states are free," the Court has said, "to adopt such rules of con-
flict of laws as they choose ... [within certain limits]."" If it is meant
by this that one state may give less recognition to another state's laws
than was given by way of comity at common law, then this view would
seem to be indefensible on its face, since it seems clearly to be contrary to
the express words and the convention history of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.12 However, when the language of the Supreme Court ex-
314 U. S. 2o, 21o, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. ed. 152 (194').
8Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U. S. 201, 21, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. ed.
152 (1941).
Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U. S. 201, 210, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. ed.
152 (1941). See also Pacific Ins. Co. v. Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 500, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83
L. ed. 940 (1939); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Commissioner, 294 U. S. 532, 547, 55 S. Ct.
518, 79 L. ed. 1o44 ('935)-
"5Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 73 S. Ct. 856, 97 L. ed. 1211 (1953);
Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171, 37 S. Ct. 34, 611 L. ed. 229 (1916).
U"Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 73 S. Ct. 856, 857, 97 L. ed. 1211
(1953)-
'-See i Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States (1953) 55o.
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pressing that the states are "free" within certain limits "to adopt" such
rules of conflict of laws as they choose is compared with the holdings,
it appears that the result aimed at by the framers of the Constitution
has been attained. It has been held that a statute of one state giving
rise to a right or defeating a right must be applied by the courts of
another state.13 It is only in the area of remedial law affecting the
measure of recovery,14 kind of remedy,' 5 or the time within which a
remedy must be sought'0 that the "freedom to adopt" language of the
Supreme Court has allowed any "freedom." However, it is submitted
that even in this area, states will not be allowed to apply a rule of
conflict of laws which would not at least meet the minimum recogni-
tion of "foreign law" which would have been given by comity under
the common law.'7 On the other hand, if a state should see fit to
adopt a rule of conflict of laws which gives greater recognition to
"foreign law" than the common law rules of conflict of laws required,
it is difficult to conceive any argument that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause would prevent it, as that clause sets a minimum recognition
and not a maximum. Thus, it may be that the "freedom" spoken of
by the Supreme Court is to give more effect to the acts of a sister
13Of course it is assumed that the cause of action accrued under the statute or
in the state with the statute defeating the cause of action and that there is no prob-
lem about this. Statutes giving rise to a right: First National Bank of Chicago v. Uni-
ted Air Lines, 342 U. S. 396, 73 S. Ct. 421, 96 L. ed. 44t (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U. S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 98o, 95 L. ed. 1212 (1951); Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, 154
U. S. 190, 14 S. Ct. 978, 38 L. ed. 958 (1894) (wrongful death statutes involved).
Cf. the treatment of Workmen's Compensation statutes disscussed in Annotated Con-
stitution of the United States of America (1952) 681. See note 5, supra. Statutes de-
feating a right: See The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 149,
30 L. ed. 358, 362 (1886). Certain statutes defeating a right in one person, however,
create rights in another person. See note 31, infra.
"As a matter of conflict of laws the weight of authority characterizes this
question as one of substantive law and applies the law of the lex loci. Goodrich, Con-
flict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) 254. However, some few states apply the law of the forum.
E.g., Door Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat. Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N. W. 918, 4 Ann.
Cas. 519 (104); Wooden v. Western N. Y. & P. R. R., 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E. 1050,
13 L. R. A. 458, 22 Am. St. Rep. 803 (1891). Cf. Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock,
154 U. S. 190, 14 S. Ct. 978, 38 L. ed. 958 (1894), with Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U. S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. ed. 2079, i6o A. L. R. 1231 (1945). The York case
impliedly took the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not offended by
the minority state view.
'If the law of the lex loci "awards damages in a manner which the local
machinery is not adapted to enforce, the plaintiff cannot ask to have the existing
legal machinery changed for his benefit." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949)
253. See Slater v. Mexican Nat. Ry., 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed. 9oo (1904).
"'See note 22, infra.
"See Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 59 o , iS8 L. ed. 475 (U. S. 1866). Cooley, Con-
stitutional Liw (1898) 204.
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state than the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires or to give only
the minimum, whichever the local policy of the forum state dictates.
In examining in particular the conflict of laws treatment of statutes
of limitations to determine whether the previously discussed standard
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been applied, a more intelli-
gible understandng can be had if the basic philosophy behind statutes
of limitations is first alluded to.
The object of statutes of limitations "is to fix certain periods with-
in which all suits shall be brought in the courts of a state, whether
they are brought by or against subjects, or by or against foreigners.
It has been said by John Voet with singular felicity, that controversies
are limited to a fixed period of time, lest they should be immortal,
while men are mortal: Ne autem lites immortales essent, dum litigantes
mortales sunt."18 In regard, at least, to ordinary or general statutes of
limitations or prescription of suits and lapse of time, there is no doubt
that they are strictly questions affecting the remedy, and not ques-
tions upon the merits.19
Since the application of an ordinary or general statute of limita-
tions merely bars the remedy for enforcing an established right, it has
accordingly become the generally accepted conflicts rule that the limi-
tation period of the lex fori is applied. 20 And this is true even though
the limitation period provided for by the lex loci may be shorter so
that suit may no longer be brought there or may be longer so that
a remedy is still available in the lex loci.21 Such a conflict of laws rule
has long been upheld by the Supreme Court as not offending the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.
22
Even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause is viewed as compelling
that which was done by comity at common law (herein referred to as the
strict view) rather than as an indefinite quantity which in every instance
" Story, Conflict of Laws (Redfield's ed. 1865) 766.
"'Story, Conflict of Laws (Redfield's ed. 1865) 766.
'Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) 240.
-'Restatement, Conflict of Laws 0934) §§ 603, 604. See Restatement in the
Courts (1945) 324.
2Bacon v. Howard, 2o How. 22, 15 L. ed. 811 (U. S. 1857); Townsend v. Jem-
ison, 9 How. 407, 13 L. ed. 194 (U. S. 185o); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, lo L.
ed. 177 (U. S. 1839). But the Supreme Court early indicated that it is not competent
for any state to pass an act of limitation which would in effect nullify rights
acquired in other States and allow no remedy upon them whatever. See Christmas
v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 300, i8 L. ed. 475 (U. S. 1866). See also Branson v. Kinzie,
I How. 311, 317, 11 L. ed. 143 (U. S. 1843). Cooley, Constitutional Law (1898) 204.
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the Supreme Court must approve, 23 a conflict rule applying the statute
of limitations of the lex fori, rather than the statute of limitations of
the lex loci, does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, for
such a conflict of laws rule was recognized in the common law.24 The
basis for such a conflict rule is that every nation must have a right to set-
tle for itself the times within and under which suits shall be litigated
in its own courts. If the statute of limitations of the lex fori is shorter
"There can be no pretense to say, that foreigners are entitled to crowd
the tribunals of any nation with suits of their own, which are stale and
antiquated [by the policy of the forum as expressed by its own statute
of limitations], to the exclusion of common administration of justice
between its own subjects."25 If the statute of limitations of the lex fori
is longer it is difficult to see how the defendant could complain if no
rights have been affected or vested by the running of the shorter limi-
tation period of the lex loci. Why should one be heard to complain
that the forum has a more lenient policy so as to make its courts
available for a longer period to provide a remedy for a wrong? Just
because the lex loci has a statute of limitations which closes the doors
of its courts after the time provided does not mean that the doors of
courts of sister states are thereby closed. General statutes of limita-
tions are expressions of local policy dealing with the time in which the
state's own courts may provide a remedy. Such general statutes, as
pointed out, do not purport to affect rights but only affect the remedy
in a particular court system.20 Thus, it would seem that as to general
statutes of limitations the conflict of laws rule has taken into account the
right of the lex Jori to formulate its own local policy (that is, provide
for the length of time within which rights must be sought to be en-
forced in its own courts) while at the same time not resulting in the
local policy of the lex loci being imposed upon the courts of the lex
fori. Then, in this area, at least, the only other choice and thus "freedom
to choose its own rules of conflict of laws" that a state has under the
2'See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws (1923) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 56o. See Pink v. A. A. A.
Highway Express, Inc., 314 U. S. 201, 210, 62 S. Ct. 241, 246, 86 L. ed. 152, 158 (1951),
cited supra note 9.
-1'"[It is] ... a formulary in international jurisprudence, that all suits must be
brought within the period prescribed by the local law of the country where the suit
is brought (lex fori,) otherwise the suits will be barred; and this rule is as fully recog-
nized in foreign jurisprudence, as it is in the common law." Story, Conflict of Laws
(Redfield's ed. 1865) 766.
2Story, Conflict of Laws (Redfield's ed. 1865) 768.
"See notes 19, 20, 2 1, and 22, supra.
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view of the Supreme Court is to apply the statute of limitations of
the lex loci. Since this would be a voluntary adoption of foreign local
policy it would not do violence to the stricter view of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause since a state adopting such a rule would be giving
more recognition to foreign law than was given by comity under the
common law.
27
By contrast, it is held that when a statute creating a right un-
known at common law contains an express time limitation on that
right, and suit within that time is a condition to the right, all rights cre-
ated by the statute are destroyed after the time specified in the statute
has elapsed. Thus, if the lex fori has a similar statute but which pro-
vides for a longer period of existence of the right than does the statute
of the lex loci, which latter period has elapsed, the statutory period of
the lex loci is usually held operative by the state courts.28 And in The
-See note 24, supra.
^Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss. 62o, 159 So. 841 (1935); Wingert v.
Carpenter, ioi Mich. 395, 59 N. W. 662 (189.1); Sea Grove Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Stockton, 148 Pa. 146, 23 At. 1063 (1892); Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153 (1877);
Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21 (1871). Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949)
243. But some of the cases discussing this point qualify it by insisting that, in order
for the right to be destroyed, both parties must have been resident for the statutory
period within the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose. Canadian Pac.
Ry. v. Johnston, 61 Fed. 738, 25 L. R. A. 470 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1894); Perkins v.
Guy, 55 Miss. 153, 3o Am. Rep. 5io (1877); Smith v. Webb, 181 S. W. 814 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915), and authorities cited; Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21 (1871). This quali-
fication has been criticized as a needless refinement. ."... If the statute purporting
to 'extinguish' the obligation does extinguish it, the matter ceases to be one of
procedure, and residence would become immaterial; whereas if such words do not
extinguish the obligation [which depends on construction and if interpreted by
the courts of the state of the statute, that interpretation is binding on courts of
other states applying that statute] there seems little reason for the exception
based on residence." Note (1918) 27 Yale 1078. See also Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
(3rd ed. 1949) 242. In fact, where the forum statutes created the right and contained
a limit on the right the forum has generally denied a remedy after the expiration
of that period, regardless of residence. E. g., Eastwood v. Kennedy, 44 Md. 563 (1876).
Note (1918) 27 Yale 1078. The Supreme Court of the United States in The Harris-
burg, ii9 U. S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147, 30 L. ed. 358, 362 (1886) said that "No
one will pretend that the suit ... could be maintained if brought.., after the expi-
ration [of the time limit of the lex loci qualifying the right]." And in that case
the defendant had not remained in the jurisdiction of the lex loci for the entire
time, yet the running of that period, nevertheless, was held to kill the right and
nothing remained to sue on. Unless the lex loci itself has a provision tolling the
running of its own period of limitation when the defendant leaves that juris-
diction it would seem that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would and should
compel other states to recognize that no cause of action exists at all. For, the sec-
ond state in recognizing rights in the plaintiff, which does not alone offend the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, would be rejecting the force of "public acts" in fixing rights
in the defendant, which does offend the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
19541
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Harrisburg,29 the Supreme Court of the United States declared that:
"No one will pretend that the suit...could be maintained if
brought...'after the expiration... [of the limitation period of the
lex locil."3ao Thus, if the statute of limitations has operated to ex-
tinguish the right or pass title, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is
submitted, requires recognition of the force of such statutes in fixing
such rights whenever controversy arises in any other state.3 '
However, even if a cause of action arises under a statute creating
a right unknown at common law and containing an express time
limitation, and suit within that time is a condition on that right
and all rights are destroyed after the specified time has elapsed, most
state jurisdictions have refused to apply the limitation of the lex loci
if that time has not run but the time limitation provided by a similar
statute of the lex [ori, if held to be applicable to the enforcement in
the forum of such out-of-state causes of action, has expired. In such a
situation the usual conflicts rule of the states is that the time limita-
tion of the forum applies.
32
In the recent case of Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 33 it was argued
by the plaintiff that such an application of the shorter limitation
"1 19 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140, 30 L. ed. 358 (1886).
Sl19 U. S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147, 3o L. ed. 358, 362 (1886).
3Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 S. Ct. 209, 29 L. ed. 483 (1885) (title to
chattels passed on running of statutory period); Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599,
17 L. ed. 261 (U. S. 1862) (title to land passed on running of statutory period); The
Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140, 3o L. ed. 358 (1886) (running of statutory
period of a wrongful death statute extinguishing the right was held to create
rights in the defendant, but with no mention of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
Story seems to be the first in dealing with this question as a matter of comity, to
suggest that courts of the lex fori should enforce statutes of limitations or pre-
scription of the lex loci when these had already operated to pass title and thus
create rights. See Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834) 487. The cor-
rectness of Story's suggestion has been recognized by both the Supreme Court of
the United States and by the Court of Common Pleas in England. See Shelby v.
Guy, i i Wheat. 361, 6 L. ed. 495 (U. S. 1826); Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. (N. C.) 202,
211 (1835). If such be the rule of comity the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it is sub-
mitted, makes it binding on the states.
mWhite v. Govatos, 40 Del. 349, 1o A. (2d) 524 (1939); Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198
N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857, 68 A. L. R. 210 (1930); Rosenweig v. Heller, 302 Pa.
279, 153 Atl. 346 1931). Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99
N. W. 620 (19o4) appears to be contra but contains a distinguishing point. It was
held that the statute of limitation provision of the lex loci always applied in this
type of situation; but this would not seem to be directly contra to the holding in
most jurisdictions as the limitation provision in the statute of the forum creating
similar rights was construed as affecting the right created only as not intended
to affect causes of action not arising under it.
M345 U. S. 514, 73 S. Ct. 856, 97 L. ed. 1211 (1953). See note 1, supra.
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period of the lex fori constituted a refusal to give full faith and credit
to the public acts of the state in which the cause of action had arisen.
In this case, Cheek Wells was killed in Alabama when a grinding
wheel with which he was working burst. The wheel had been
manufactured by respondent, Simonds Abrasive Co., a corporation
with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, the
administratrix of the estate of Cheek Wells, brought an action for
damages in the Federal Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
after one year, but within two years, after the death of Cheek Wells,
jurisdiction being based upon diversity of citizenship. The section of
the Alabama Code upon which the plaintiff predicated her action
for wrongful death provided that suit "must be brought within two
years from and after the death .... ,,34 The respondent, Simonds Abra-
sive Co., moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Penn-
sylvania wrongful death statute required suit to be brought within
one year. The district judge ruled that the Pennsylvania statute, which
was analogous to the Alabama statute, had a one-year limitation and
that the Pennsylvania conflict of laws rule called for the application of
its own limitation rather than that of the place of the injury and,
deeming himself bound by the Pennsylvania conflicts rule, ordered
summary judgment for the respondent.35 The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed.30
Though not fully dealt with by the courts, three problems are
presented by the case: i) Which limitation period would the Penn-
sylvania state courts have applied; 2) If the Pennsylvania state courts
would have applied the forum state's limitation period, would this
application be a denial of full faith and credit to the public acts of the
lex loci; and 3) Must a federal court, when jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship, act as a mirror of the state courts where it
sits in every instance? Of these the latter two present constitutional
questions, and consideration of the Wells case will be limited to them.
3 7
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in the
Wells case but limited consideration to the second of the above prob-
lems-that is, whether the Pennsylvania conflicts rule calling for the
application of its own limitation period violates the Full Faith and
3'Ala. Code (1940) Civil Remedies and Procedure § 123. The limitation period
of this provision has been construed as a condition on the right itself and not merely
remedial. Parker v. Fies and Sons, 243 Ala. 349, 350, 10 S. (2d) 13, 15 (1952).
3Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 102 F. Supp. 519 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1951).
clWells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 195 F. (2d) 814 (C. A. 3rd, 1952).
1For the limitation period Pennsylvania state courts would have applied see
Rosenweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 AtL. 346 (193).
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Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution.38 In a five to three decision,
the Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally apply its
own limitation of time within which a suit in the lex fori could be
brought on a cause of action which accrued in and was based upon a
statute of the other state.
As to the full faith and credit aspect of the Wells case, Chief
Justice Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion, observed that:
"Our prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not compel the forum state to use the period of limitation
of a foreign state. We see no reason in the present situation to
graft an exception onto it. Differences based upon whether the
foreign right was known to the common law or upon the ar-
rangement of the code of the foreign state are too unsubstan-
tial to form the basis for constitutional distinctions under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause." 39
It would seem that as to all things pertaining to the right as dis-
tinguished from the remedy alone the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires that "the force of such statutes in fixing such rights or ob-
ligations shall be recognized in controversies arising in any other
State." 40 And, as pointed out by the dissent in the Wells case, the Su-
preme Court has long taken the position that if "The liability and the
remedy are created by the same statutes .... the limitations of the
remedy are ... to be treated as limitations of the right."41 Apparently
the dissent reads the majority view in the Wells case as a repudiation
of the position of the Court that such limitations of the remedy are
to be treated as limitations of the right, for the dissent posed the
query: "Suppose even now she [the plaintiff] can get service in a state
with no statute of limitation or a longer one; can she thereby revive
a cause of action that has expired under Alabama law?" 42 And in
answer the dissent reasoned that "The Court's logic would so indi-
sWells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 344 U. S. 815, 73 S. Ct. 57, 97 L. ed. 634 (1952).
3345 U. S. 514, 517, 73 S. Ct. 856, 858, 97 L. ed. 1211, 1216 (1953).
40Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution (1922) 475. See Cooper v.
Newell, 173 U. S. 555, 19 S- Ct. 506, 43 L. ed. 8o8 (189g).
1
The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147, 3o L. ed. 358, 362 (1885). Cf.
Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 454, 24 S. Ct. 692, 693, 48 L. ed. 1067 (19o4); Slater v.
Mexican National Ry., 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed. 9oo (19o4); Engel
v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 38, 46 S. Ct. 410, 412, 70 L. ed. 813 (1926). See dissent,
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Go., 345 U. S. 514, 519, 73 S. Ct. 856, 862, 97 L. ed.
1211, 1216 (1953), where the above cited cases were viewed as establishing the
doctrine that, in such circumstances as are here being considered, "the remedy is in-
separable from the right...." 345 U. S. 514, 525, 73 S. Ct 856, 862, 97 L. ed. 1211,
1220 (1953).
'2 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 522, 73 S. Ct. 856, 86o, 97 L. ed
1211, 1218 (1953).
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cate."43 Having thus posed the question and supplied the answer, the
dissent concluded that "The life of her [the plaintiff's] cause of
action is then determined by the fortuitous circumstances that enable
her to make service of process in a certain state or states." 44
However, the dissent is viewing the Court's position in the situa-
tion where the limitation period contained in the statute of the lex loci
has not run and the lex fori applies its shorter limitation period as a
repudiation of the Court's position in the situation where the limi-
tation period of the lex loci has run and the limitation period of the
lex fori is longer. The distinction between the two situations is a rele-
vant one involving different considerations. If the limitation period of
the lex loci in this type case has run, the cause of action no longer
exists, and there is nothing for the local policy of the lex fori to operate
upon.45 On the other hand, if the limitation period of the lex loci
has not run, there is a cause of action for the local policy of the lex Jori
to operate upon. Whether or not the local policy of the lex fori should
be allowed to operate and what the effect of such operation should
be present additional problems.
As to the first problem-that is, whether or not the local policy of
the lex fori in this type case should be allowed to operate on an exist-
ing out-of-state-created cause of action-it should be remembered that
at common law certain foreign causes of action were enforced by the
forum as a matter of comity, provided such enforcement did not over-
ride local policy;46 and (as is submitted above 47) it was this limited
recognition which the Full Faith and Credit Clause undertook to pre-
serve as between the states. If a state can now arrange its code so
that the local policy of the state becomes part of the "right," and
if this part of the "right" is given the protection of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, it could result in the local policy of the lex loci
being forced upon the lex fori, even though the lex fori might have
a conflicting local policy. In fact this is the result argued for by the
plaintiff in the Wells case. The answer should be no different just be-
cause the right of action created by the statute was unknown to the
common law. For, even though the right of action was unknown to
the common law, the fact that the lex Jori in enforcing a foreign cause
3Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 522, 73 S. Ct. 856, 860, 97 L. ed.
1211, 1218 (1953).
"Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 522, 73 S. Ct. 856, 86o, 97 L. ed.
1211, 1218 (1953).
;See notes 28, 29, and 31, supra.
"Story, Conflict of Laws (Redfield's ed. 1865) 768.
'4See notes 6 and 17, supra.
1954] NOTE
58 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
of action would subject it to the local policy (including periods of
limitation)4s of the lex fori was not unknown.
The view of the dissent that the majority position affects the
life of the plaintiff's cause of action seems unwarranted, as the ma-
jority cited "the well established principle of conflict of laws [as set
out in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws] 49 that 'If action is barred
by the statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be maintained
[there] though action is not barred in the state where the cause of
action arose'." 0 This is the rule applicable to general statutes of
limitations, and no one seems to have seriously contended that the
life of the cause of action is thereby shortened; nor is there any-
thing inconsistent between the application of this rule to the instant
type case and the proposition that in such a case the cause of action
ceases to exist upon the running of the time limitation condition of
the lex loci.51
'8See Story, Conflict of Laws (Redfield's ed. 1865) 766.
"DRestatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 603.
r°Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 516, 73 S. Ct. 856, 857, 97 L. ed.
1211, 1215 (1953).-
''The dissent in the Wells case, however, argued that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause would compel the use of the statutory period provided for by the
lex loci, basing its argument on three lines of cases: (i) That "Even as to general
statutes of limitation recent decisions have bound the right and the limitation
into a single bundle to be taken by the federal court as a whole." Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 523, 73 S. Ct. 856, 861, 97 L. ed. 1211, 1219 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion), citing Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U. S.
530, 533, 69 S. Ct. 1233, 1235, 93 L. ed. 1520 (1940). From this treatment of general
statutes of limitation in a federal court the dissent implies that a fortiori the same
treatment should be given when the limitation qualifies the right. However, such
would not seem to follow from the Ragan Case since it involved no conflict of laws
problem (that is, choice between two states-which law is to be applied) but in-
volved the problem of the choice of either federal improvised law or settled state
law. For a consideration of the latter problem of choice see the continuation of this
Note in the following issue of the Wash. and Lee L. Rev. And even the dissent
earlier in its opinion recognized the distinguishing feature of the Ragan case.
See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 523, 73 S. Ct. 856, 861, 96 L. ed.
1211, 1218 (1953). (2) That whatever the argument concerning general statutes of
limitation as applied to common-law causes, that the Supreme Court has "long
ago recognized a distinction as to limitations on ... [an] action created by statutes
in the pattern of the Lord Campbell Act. This Court early held such an action in
federal court to be barred by the limitation contained in the applicable state
statute." Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 524, 73 S. Ct. 856, 861 (1953)
(dissenting opinion), citing the Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147, 30 L.
ed. 358 (1886) and supporting language in Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 454, 24 S. Ct.
692, 693, 48 L. ed. 1o67 (1904) and Slater v. Mexican National Ry., 194 U. S. 120,
24 S. Ct. 581, 48 L. ed. 900 (19o). From the Supreme Court's position in the cases
where the limitation of the lex loci had run the dissent reasoned that the limitation
of the lex loci should apply likewise to prevent the cause of action from being barred
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NOTE
Is is submitted that the majority in the Wells case has allowed the
cause of action which accrued in Alabama all the recognition it is
historically entitled to under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
JAMES W. H. STEvART*
LAWRENCE C. MUSGROVE
(Continued in the next issue of the Washington and Lee Law Review)
in a state with a shorter statute of limitation. But, again, the obvious distinction
would seem to be that where the limitation of the lex loci has run, rights have been
created in the defendant or rights of the plaintiff destroyed whereas before the
running of such limitation period the limitation period has operated on nothing.
But, as pointed out, if the limitation period has operated to destroy the right,
this being recognized renders the court powerless to act; that is, no cause of action
exists to act upon; whereas if the limitation period has not yet operated to de-
stroy old rights or create new rights then even if such a period is recognized
as part of the right for some purposes it does not follow that it must be so
recognized for all purposes and that the forum may not in addition require that
forum local remedial policy be complied with. In addition to these distinguishing
features, the same objection exists as to this line of cases as exists as to the first
line of cases. That is, in these cases the question was not which state law should
be applied, but whether a state rule or an independent federal rule should be ap-
plied. Thus entirely different considerations were involved. See the continuation of
this Note in the following issue of the Wash. and Lee. L. Rev. (3) That the validity
of a doctrine does not depend on whose ox it gores and the doctrine of unity of
the remedy and the right in this type case has been applied to plaintiffs as well
as defendants. The Supreme Court has, argued the dissent, "employed the same
premise as to the unity of the right and the limitation to hold a plaintiff entitled
to the longer period prescribed in federal legislation instead of the shorter statu-
tory period of the forum state, saying of the limitation, 'This provision is one of
substantive right, setting a limit to the existence of the obligation which the Act
creates.... And it necessarily implies that the action may be maintained, as a sub-
stantive right, if commenced within the two years'." Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,
345 U. S. 514, 525, 73 S. Ct 856, 862, 97 L. ed. 1211, 1220 (1953) (dissenting opinion),
citing Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 38, 46 S. Ct. 410, 412, 7o L. ed. 813 (1926).
But as pointed out in the majority opinion in the Wells case, the Engel case would
seem to have no application here. "It presented an entirely different problem. Once it
was decided that the intention of Congress was that the ... [limitation period con-
tained in the federal statutory cause of action was meant to apply in both federal and
state courts] under our Federal Constitution, that was the supreme law of the land."
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 518, 73 S. Ct 856, 858, 97 L. ed. 1211,
1216 (1953)-
*Assistant Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Washington and Lee Univer-
sity, 1953-54.
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